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INTRODUCTION
In December 1971 the State of Pakistan, established
m 1947 as a result of the division of the Indian sub-
continent, broke up. A secessionist movement aided by an
Indian military invasion separated East Pakistan from West
Pakistan.
What happened to Pakistan is indeed a matter of great
interest to students of politics, and doubtless many studie
of its various aspects will in time be undertaken. The sec-
essionist movement in East Pakistan might eventually have
succeeded, but it would have taken many more years. It is
also possible that in due time a political settlement might
have been made
.
However, the immediate cause of Pakistan’s dismember-
ment was the Indian invasion and victory. This invasion did
not come without warning, India had become involved in the
Pakistani civil war almost from the very beginning. The
success of Indian intervention throws significant light on
the role of force in India's foreign policy, the inefficacy
of Pakistan's alliances, and most important the ineffect-
iveness of Pakistan's political order which was known for
its non-responsiveness to the aspirations of the masses in
2Pakistan. It is for these reasons that I have chosen to
study, the break up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangla
Desh.
3CHAPTER I
EAST PAKISTAN'S GROWING DISAFFECTION
Before going into the details of the East Pakistan
crisis and its struggle for independance
,
it is essential
to look at the historical developments which show that the
conflict was not altogether new, that its roots were buried
deep in the basic cultural, geographical, traditional and
linguistic differences between the two wings of Pakistan.
And to make matters still worse they were separated by a
thousand miles of hostile territory, the only binding factor
being that of religion. The Pakistani claim that the Muslims
of the Indian sub-continent were a nation was one, "that
the Indian nationalist could never concede and the Western
observer could scarcely understand. Yet it is the only ess-
ential point behind the movement that led to Pakistan." 1
Pakistan was born as a full fledged nation in name but
lacked what is perhaps the most essential attribute of any
modern state, a strong industrial base. Almost all of the
sub-continent's great resources of coal, iron, bauxite and
other minerals were on the Indian side. The strongest economic
Kieth B. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London,
1968), p. 11
4concentrations were in the great ports: Bombay, Calcutta
and Madras which were all in India; only Karachi, a comp-
aratively minor and more recently developed port was in
Pakistan. Pakistan had only a few secondary industries like
textiles, glass, leather and its resourses were very inade-
quate. East Pakistan was also badly affected by the Partit-
ion. When Bengal was one unit, jute was a mainstay of the
economy. More than three quarters of the world's raw jute
was grown in East Bengal which became East Pakistan, but
there was no jute mill: all of the jute mills were in a
60-mile strip along the Hoogly River north of Calcutta.
Apart from jute East Pakistan had no other cash crop except
tea. All the rice it grows it needs for its own people.
East Pakistan had even less industry than West Pakistan.
Thus Pakistan was born in very unfavourable circumst-
ances. "India inherited a working federal capital with the
majority of the cabinet and other public servants willing
to continue at their posts. Pakistan had to create a new
p
capital and a new government,"
Pakistan did not possess a history of national unity
with a common language or uniform culture ; nor was it a
geographical or an economic unit. Consequently the achieve-
ment of a national consensus on a constitution remained one
2 Kieth B. Callard, ojd. cit .
.
p. 14
5of its most difficult problems. A constitution acceptable
to different geographical, cultural and linguistic groups
in the country remained an elusive goal. The Basic Princip-
les Committee of the Constituent Assembly presented a report
in 1950 which alarmed the East Pakistani's. The Report
proposed that East Pakistan on the one hand, and the prov-
inces of West Pakistan on the other, would have equal repres-
entation in the National Legislature. The East Pakistani's
had two reasons for alarm. "Firstly they inferred that the
composition of the new legislature would transform Bengal’s
numerical majority into a minority of seats. Secondly the
Report contained the flat announcement that Urdu was to be
the national language,"-^
Here one sees the first signs of resentment on the part
of East Pakistan. The principle of parity was in contravent-
ion of the principle of representation according to populat-
ion. The issue of language assumed an explosive character; in
fact the demand for Bengali became the focal point of an
emerging national identity in East Pakistan. The language
movement was steadily built up to such a point that on
February 20, 1952 when a prohibitory order under Section
144 Criminal Procedure Code, was clamped on Dacca to prev-
ent demonstrations, it was defied which resulted in police
3 Kieth B. Callard, ojd. cit
.
, p. 92
6firing followed by a violent civil commotion. The day of
the police firing came to be immortalized as 'Shahid Day'
and has been observed to express ’Bengali Nationalism' ever
since. The result was that the central government had to
yield on the language issue, and Bengali won equality with
Urdu,
Even as early as 1948 a feeling of disillusionment
was prevelant in East Pakistan. A Bengali member said in
the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan: "A feeling is grow-
ing among the East Pakistani’s that Eastern Pakistan is
being neglected and treated merely as a Colony of West
k
Pakistan.
"
The depth of East Pakistan's anger was, however, not
fully analysed by the central government in the early days.
Later on, it was turned into questioning as to who had won
Pakistan. "We have seen in Bengal, in particular during
the election of 1946, when others, non-Bengali muslims in
other provinces were not voting for Pakistan, 99 per cent
of the muslim population of Bengal did vote for the purpose
of achieving Pakistan."^
There was obvious frustration when the rulers of Pak-
istan started to treat East Pakistan and its interests as
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, II, No.l
Feb. 24, 1948, p. 6. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed.
The Political System of Pakistan (London, 1967 )» p.64
5 Mahbudul Huq, National Assembly of Pakistan Debates,
7subordinate
. This state of mind can be understood in the
context of the changed power base after Partition. The
majority of the participants in the governing of Fakistan
fell mto two principal categories: the selected and the
elected, or in other words the bureaucrats and the polit-
icians.^
So far as the bureaucracy was concerned, be it milit-
ary or civil, East Pakistan immediately after Partition
was badly unrepresented. There was only one ICS officer
from the eastern wing. East Pakistani politicians were also
not an effective countervailing group against the dominance
of Western bureaucrats. From the beginning East Pakistanis
were not happy about the influx of officials from the west-
ern wing, most of whom did not know Bengali. The latter on
their part, complained that they were being treated by the
East Pakistanis as outsiders, who would niether help them-
selves nor allow anyone else to help them. Considering the
important role played by government officials, it is imp-
ortant that even towards the end the Civil Service of
Pakistan included only a very small proportion of Bengalis
in the top positions.
The armed services of Pakistan also included very few
Bengalis. This was partly the fault of the British rule in
April 16, 1963. p. 1895
Henry F. Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan
(London, 1964), p. 36
8India. The British had deliberately adopted the policy of
keeping Bengalis out of the armed forces. For them the
Bengalis were politically too conscious and too eager to
take to terrorising tactics for ousting the foreign rulers.
The main areas of recruitment had been the Punjab and the
North-Western Frontier. Thus after Partition the superior
positions were held mainly by the non-Bengalis, and it would
obviously take some time for the new recruits from East
Pakistan to reach those positions.
Another cause of resentment for the East Pakistanis
was that inspite of the fact that the majority of the Pak-
istanis lived in the East Wing the capital was located in
the West, first Karachi and then Islamabad. Moreover they
were deprived of enormous economic benefits that the locat-
ion of the capital conferred on the West wing.
Economic exploitation was one of the most important
complaints of the East Pakistanis. As I mentioned earlier,
from the beginning East and West Pakistan have been a pair
of economic invalids, and of these two weaklings, East
Pakistan began as the more sickly partener and has remained
so. It is the poorest and the most populated area in the
world. At the time of Partition East Pakistan’s population
was around forty million. By 1961, it was fifty one million
and now it is seventy five million. It is an area of great
and repeated natural disaster.
9The economic imbalance between the two regions has been
partly an inheritance from the British rule. After the un-
checked depradations of the East India Company in the days
of Clive and Hastings? it has remained a poverty stricken
area. Even in the years after Partition, successive admin-
istrations have made only feeble efforts to improve the
situation.
Unfortunately for the country as a whole, there was
not much economic development during the first few years
after Partition. One of the reasons was political instabil-
ity in the country. Furthermore the main pre -occupation
of the Central Government for a number of years was centered
around such matters as Kashmir, the division of the Indus
Valley water resources, and other causes of friction with
India. All these things concerned East Pakistan only ind-
irectly, but were of vital interest to West Pakistan.
Industrial development also went ahead in West Pakistan
because from the very beginning, its infra-structure was
superior, for example communications. The rudimentary ind-
ustry which Pakistan had begun with was almost entirely
in the West, and was mainly in textiles. This was therefore
the natural springboard for development alongside the main
cash crop of the West wing, cotton. Moreover major entre-
preneurs who emigrated form Bombay, India’s commercial
metropolis, to Karachi; and the powerful landlords of Sind
10
and the Punjab, all had strong vested interests in the West.
In the nast in contrast there was no industrial base, no
natural resources, it was desperately handicapped, and an
extremely difficult base on which to build. According to
Ziring,
Even Pakistan's faulty statistics cannot hide thefact that West Pakistan is six times the size ofHast Pakistan, that the natural endowments ofWest Pakistan although not extraordinary are moreimpressive than those of East Pakistan, and finally,that the density of population in West Pakistan is
under 200 persons per square mile whereas in East
Pakistan it is now well over 1,000.,-,
East Pakistan's claim that its jute has been the major
foreign exchange earner of the country, and that its profits
have been spent to develop West Pakistan is justified. But
even if East Pakistan retained all the profits from its jute
crop, it would still not be sufficient to raise the standard
of living of the average peasant. "It is cruel realism which
dictates how a country allocates its priorities and scarce
o
treasure .
"
During the late 1950’s and 60's, some jute mills were
built in East Pakistan which by 1970, were able to process
about a quarter of East Pakistan’s jute output. This helped
but not enough. Efforts were also made to develop the
Chittagong port as a substitute for Calcutta, but commun-
ications between Chittagong and the far out areas of East
^ Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era (New York, 1971)
p. 41
^ Ibid
. ,
p. 41
11
Pakistan were not adequate.
The Ayub regime made attempts to remove the disparity
between the two wings. For example, the Central budget all-
ocated more funds to East Pakistan than to the West. "If
a fertilizer factory, steel mill or sugar refinery was to be
in the West, East Pakistan had to be given one too,"^
New buildings and roads were constructed in the urban areas,
specially in places like Dacca, which lent a rather deceptive
appearance to East Pakistan's economic plight. But the econ-
omic condition of the rural people constituting about 90% of
the total population continued to deteriorate; dissatisfact-
ion and dissillusionment prevailed throughout the province.
The masses could not be satisfied with this kind of
window dressing. The largest project in the province at
Kobadak on the Ganges, which is still not complete, was
contemplated not to be enough to hold the heavy floods or
to provide sufficient irrigation works. Moreover the East
Pakistanis felt that the sums spent in West Pakistan on the
Mangla and Tarbela dams were much greater, and that they
were also being completed at a much greater speed.
The new capital at Islamabad also symbolized the
grotesque disparity between the two wings. Infact this was
unfortunate for the country as a whole, because an expensive
9 Ziring, ojd. cit
.
.
p. 42
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project like "that should never have been given priority
in a developing nation. Later on inorder to appease the
Bengali sentiment a second 'capital' was begun at Dacca.
Whatever efforts were made on the part of the Central
Government were just not enough to reduce the disparity
in the per capita income between the East and the West
wings
.
In a relatively unknown document prepared by the
Finance Commission in 1963 the disparity enigma
was dissected. They found that it would take 25
years for the provinces to be brought abreast of
one another economically! and that the target could
only be achieved if development in the West wing
was drastically curtailed. The intimation was that
deceleration would have to be almost total. Obviously
this was an impossible proposal.
This would have meant an extremely compassionate atitude
on the part of West Pakistan, which was too much to expect.
On the other hand the frustration of the East Pakistanis
is fully justified.
From the early years of independance
,
the center had
assumed a control of most aspects of government so as to
stabilize the new state and to meet emergencies. It held
the principal sources of revenue and had assumed wide auth-
ority to control the social and economic life of the country.
"Its activities were centred at Karachi, withen easy reach
11
of Sind and the Punjab but remote from East Bengal."
10 Ziring, ojd. cit .
.
p, 43
11 Kieth B. Callard, 0 £. cit .
.
p. 173
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After the death of Jinnah, the Chief Minister of Bengal
Khawaja Nazimuddin was elevated to the post of Governor
General. This choice was probably made keeping in view the
personality and potential of Nazimuddin. One could expect
Bengali predominance if Nazimuddin succeeded in using his
post in the same way as Jinnah did. But this was not so,
thus although Nazimuddin was the Governor General, it was
Prime Minister Liaqat Ali who had the real power, "Under
Jinnah, the Governor General had controlled the cabinet,
henceforward it was Liaqat* s intention to have the cabinet
control the Governor General.
When in October 1951 1 Liaqat Ali was assassinated,
Nazimuddin, presuming that the Prime Ministership was a
more powerful office stepped down and became the Prime
Minister. Ghulam Mohammed became the Governor General. He
was a forceful man and was not to be dominated by Nazimuddin,
and ultimately Ghulam Mohammed dismissed Nazimuddin on April
1 7» 1953. With the appointment of Ghulam Mohammed as the
Governor General the bureaucracy was introduced into polit-
ics. Ghulam Mohammed had been a former civil servant, and
as Finance Minister had exerted substantial control in the
cabinet. His becoming Governor General laid the foundations
of what is known as the military-bureaucratic complex in
12 Kieth B. Callard, ojd. cit .
. p. 21
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Pakistan. In fact the arbitrary dismissal of Nazimuddin
was an example of bureaucratic autarchy in which law and
the constitution had little relevance.
After that Ghulam Mohammed in search of a pliable
Bengali, had to go up to Washington where Mohammed Ali Bogra
was then the Ambassador, "He was brought in as Prime Min-
ister, but although a Bengali he remained a captive of the
West Pakistan group that provided the main strength of his
government,” ^ Thus further weakening the association of
^ast Bengal with the Central Government.
The East and West polemics gained a new dimension,
on the introduction of the One Unit scheme, which envisag-
ed the integration of the provinces and other areas of West
Pakistan into a single province. The separation between
East and West Pakistan is a geographical factor which can-
not be corrected. However, withen West Pakistan the prov-
incial boundaries were more the product of history and
administrative convenience. But although geographically
they formed a bloc, each had an individuality of its own.
The Punjabis, the Sindhis, the Pathans and the Baluchis
were not merely linguistic groups, but also had different
cultural and ethnic entities. However, no matter, "how
strong the feeling of local separatism might be, the prev-
ailing division of the country in 19^7-55 was highly unsat-
13 Kieth B. Callard, 0£. cit .
.
p. 173
15
isfactory. The 1954 draft constitution would have permitted
nine units to continue their individual existence in West
Pakistan. All of these form part of the Indus river basin
and all depend upon a single port-Karachi. Several of the
nine were too poor to maintain adequate machinery of govern-
ment and to undertake large scale programmes of development
.
Moreover there was a great deal of political intrigue
in the existence of so many separate provincial ministries
and legislatures, "democracy was reduced to a mere pretence
carried on in the interests of a handful of self-seeking
political bosses." 1 ^
Suggestions for unification were made from time to
time but it was not seriously considered until 1954 . There
was a deep seated fear among the provinces that unification
would mean the control of West Pakistan by the Punjab. It
is true, that "a certain amount of coercion had to be app-
lied to bring about a major integration such as has been
accomplished in West Pakistan ." 16 The unification did make
the task of constitution making easier, before that the
question of representation of so many units had been a
major hurdle. Even from the administrative point of view
Kieth B. Callard, oj). cit
. ,
p. 184
15 Ibid ., p. 186
16 Ibid .
.
p. 18?
16
it was cumbersome and wasteful to have nine units. With the
integration of West Pakistan, the country would have only
two provinces—East Pakistan and West Pakistan, and they
would have equal representation in the national legislature
and, gradually in the administrative services. East Pakistan
was not at aU happy about this move. They felt this was a
conspiracy on the .part of the Punjabis to nullify their
status as the majority province.
East Pakistan’s politicians happened to be sharp and
energetic critics when they were not enjoying office in
collusion with the West Pakistanis. A. K. Fazlul Haq and
H. S. Suhrawardy stood out as strong men in Bengal’s polit-
ics in the first few years after partition, and were succ-
essful at least for some time in unifying the opposition.
Much of the political anger in East Pakistan was the result
of the drift of power towards the West. This brought about
a sense of common danger which in turn unified the opposit-
ion parties in East Pakistan. Thus emerged the United Front,
its rallying force was the anti-status quo urge coupled with
the Bengali feeling of resentment and revolt against the
monopoly of the West and its assertion of power.
In September 1956 Suhrawardy, the Awami League leader,
became the fifth Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was the
slogan of provincial autonomy of East Pakistan which had
brought Mr. Suhrawardy to power. Soon after he came to power
17
there was a rift in the Awami League, which led to a weak-
ening of Suhrawardy's government. There was also growing
dissatisfaction because of the non-implementation of the
Awami League program of achieving full regional autonomy
for East Pakistan. Suhrawardy and his followers were prep-
ared to disregard the principles which had brought them to
power, in order to enjoy office.
Nazimuddin and Bogra were essentially weak men. Suhraw-
ardy was strong personally, but the line-up of forces in the
National Assembly did not permit him sufficient legislative
support to do justice to East Pakistan's demands. Doing
justice to East Pakistan would have meant bringing about
something of a revolution. It would have meant restraining
the higher bureaucracy, the military and the emerging busin-
ess and industrial elite. These interests might have been
restrained in the mid-1950’s only if East Pakistani legislat-
ors had faced them together and threatened revolt convincingly
But at that time the East Pakistani discontent had not ?.
reached revolutionary proportions. East Pakistan’s political
power was fractionized and many of the East Pakistani lead-
ers were more interested in the pursuit of personal power
and profit than in advancing the interests of East Pakistan.
Consequently they were willing to make deals with the centers
of power in West Pakistan. Thus although between 1947-1958
18
there were three East Pakistani prime ministers, none of
them had the initiative nor the capacity to play a major
role in the decision making processes.
Serious economic and political crisis was brewing in
Pakistan. The frequent changes in government were a sign
of disagreement withen the ruling camp and of serious
factional strife. In 1958, East Pakistan experienced two
ministerial crises, the removal of the provincial governor,
the dismissal of the government and the imposition of
President's rule on June 24, 1958. Then in September 1958,
while the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan debated the
provincial budget, fierce fighting broke out in the House
between members of the ruling block and the opposition. In
the course of the skirmish the Speaker of the Assembly was
killed and several deputies seriously injured.
The disintegration of political life in Pakistan
ultimately led to the military coup in October 1958. Isk-
ander Mirza abrogated the 1956 constitution, dismissed the
central and provincial governments, dissolved the National
Assembly, and the provincial assemblies, banned all polit-
ical parties, and proclaimed martial law throughout the
country. General Mohammed Ayub Khan Commander-in-Chief of
the Pakistan army was appointed as Chief Administrator and
charged with the implementation of these measures. However,
19
on October 27, 1958, the two man regime of Iskander Mirza
and Ayub Khan came to an end; instead Ayub Khan assumed all
authority himself. On 28th October 1958 he installed a
Presidential Cabinet with no Prime Minister.
The elimination of party politics and the imposition
of military rule dismayed East Pakistanis who felt their
interests could not be safegaurded in a highly centralized
structure. For the Bengalis the meaning of the military
coup was that it marked the culmination of the ascendancy
of the military-bureaucratic elite in Pakistan and the rel-
egation of the leaders of political parties to a status of
insignificance in public life. For East Pakistan the major
problem was that party politics which was the only means
available for asserting its rights had now become insign-
ificant. In niether the army nor the bureaucracy did East
Pakistan have adequate representation.
In 1962, Ayub Khan gave the country a constitution,
but this meant little change in the nature of the power
structure. The essential features of the structure were
the establishment of a Presidential government, the creation
of a pseudo-democratic state with the help of the so-called
basic democracies, and the protection and perpetuation of
the military-bureaucratic complex as the source of power
and authority.
20
Even while martial law remained in force, the troops
were relieved of their duties. But, "the bureaucracy, the
steel frame of the British adminstration, continued as one
of the two pillars of government, throughout this period.
President Ayub Khan found the situation in East Pakistan
particularly disturbing, so his regime ventured to give
more attention to the provincial disparity issue. The const-
itution of 1962 devoted a passage to this dilemma. It declar-
ed that all efforts would be made to satisfy the economic
demands of the people of the East Wing. "But even with
increased investment of government money, the granting of
greater provincial autonomy in virtually all the develop-
mental and public utility spheres, and the determination
to 'Bengalize* the adminstration there was no quelling of
1
8
the anti-government disturbances."
It was claimed on behalf of Ayub Khan that during his
p&gime important steps were taken to redress the imbalance
between East and West Pakistan. It is also true that the
Ayub regime had succeeded in registering notable economic
progress in Pakistan and at least part of the benefits would
have flowed to East Pakistan. Steps were taken by the gov-
ernment to increase the flow of aid and investment to East
^ Ziring, o£. cit .
,
p. 12
18 Ibid.
.
p. 40
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Pakistan, and also to improve their position withen the
army and the civil services of Pakistan. But from the point
of view of East Pakistan all these efforts were totally in-
adequate
.
While talking about the economic progress during the
Ayub regime, it is noteworthy that most of the progress was
the result of the pursuit of economic policies which were cal-
culated to help the unbridled private sector without any
regard for social justice. Towards the end of the Ayub
regime glaring inequalities in the economy of Pakistan
were revealed. Almost the entire benefit of industrial
development had been confined to about twenty families of
Pakistan. What was more interesting was the nature of the
industrial elite that was encouraged to expand and the
methods through which they did so. It was quite obvious
that the new industrial class was sharing its benefits
with the military-bureaucratic complex through institut-
ionalized corruption of all kinds.
According to various economic reports, "Pakistan was
making significant gains in all economic sectors but prec-
ious little was filtering down to the poor urban and rural
people. Concentration of capital was justified on the
19
grounds, that profits were plowed back into the economy."
19 Ziring, op. cit . , p.89
22
In addition to this, the resources, experiences and
contacts of the leading private families made them strong
contenders for ownership when semi-governmental corporat-
ions put their plants on the open market. "It is estimated
that over 2/3 of the assets thus sold have been bought by
Of)
the leading families."
The condition of the masses was wretched in both parts
of the country. The military-bureaucratic complex of Pakis-
tan was providing the infrastructure needed for the exploit-
ation of the people of Pakistan by the industrial and feudal
elite. Its owns gains in the process could well be illustrated
by the fact that the son of President Ayub Khan emerged as
a major operator on the industrial scene during his fathers
regime
However, inequitable and oppressive as this economic
structure was for the whole of Pakistan, it was particularly
so for the people of East Pakistan. There was hardly any
indigenous Bengali enterprise in East Pakistan, all major
industries being in the hands of the same families which
dominated West Pakistan.
Under those circumstances, specially after looking
at the misery of the multitude of the people, the celebrat-
ions for the decade of development which spread over a
period of four weeks in October 1968, seemed a great farce.
20 Ziring, ojp, cit . , p. 89
23
The seeming interminable repetition of slogans and the
grandiloquent speeches were more than the dissident urban
population and particularly the students could tolerate,
and towards the end of the month the disturbances began.
The chant was deafening and in unison throughout West
Pakistan: 'Ayub must go'." 21
In West Pakistan the main issue was the Ayub Khan
ouster and the tyranny of the regime was dramatized. But
in East Pakistan the issue was not limited to Ayub Khan,
the East Pakistani's demanded nothing less than a new
political structure.
This country wide agitation against the Ayub regime
gained momentum, and finally on March 25, 1969, "Ayub Khan
frustrated by the politicians, abandoned by the bureaucrats
and the police, and no longer commanding the loyalty of the
armed forces, resigned the office he had held for ten years
pp
and five months."
General Yahya Khan was brought to power and there was
a repetition of the 1958 events. Martial law was proclaimed
the national and provincial assemblies were dissolved. On
assuming office on March 31 » 1969 Yahya Khan promised the
people a return to democracy based on adult franchise when
conditions were normalized.
21
22
Ziring, oj). cit .
.
Ibid.
. p. 92
p. 90
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CHAPTER II
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY
East Pakistan’s demands for provincial autonomy, had
begun soon after Partition, but the Central Government never
really considered them seriously. The major reason for that
was that East Pakistan was never able to present a unified
front, their opposition towards the central decision process,
was sporadic, short-lived and not constructive. Time and
again different political parties did get together but
either such unity did not last long, or if their leaders
did come to power, they were just not strong enough to
push forward their demands. Later on, for about ten years
under the Ayub regime political development in both East
and West Pakistan was at a standstill. There was no freedom
of thought and expression, political parties were first
completely banned, and finally when they were allowed to
function they could hardly be called free.
I feel it is important to examine the gradual develop-
ment for East Pakistan’s growing demands for autonomy which
later changed into outbursts for secession.
Shortly after Partition it seemed as if the Muslim
League had outlived its purpose, and ironically Dacca the
25
birth-place of the Muslim League, also saw the seeds of
disintegration being sown. The Muslim League specially
after the death of Jinnah could not cope with the chaotic
condition of the country. A number of smaller political
parties already existed and the first chance for a "display
of the opposition strength came in the Punjab election of
1951 • J-he main opponents of the Muslim League ran candidates
under the banner of the Jinnah Awami League. The Awami
(Peoples) League was led by Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy and claim-
ed to fill the role of an all-Pakistan Opposition."^
In December 1952, the Awami League under the leader-
ship of Suhrawardy held a convention at which a manifesto
was adopted containing an exposition of the party’s program.
This program found the broadest response in East Pakistan.
"The leaders of the Awami League in a series of public
speeches advocated agrarian reforms and the nationalization
of the principal branches of industry." 2
In February 1954, all organizations opposing the Muslim
League united in an All-Party bloc. This combined opposition
to the Muslim League government marked the beginning of the
United Front of which Fazlul Haq became the leader. The
United Front issued a manifesto known as the 21 Points,
Pakistan Times . Lahore, July 24, 1953.
Kieth B. Callard, oj). cit
. , p. 73
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this was to be the basis of their election campaign, "It
was a document which promised something to everybody. The
preamble demanded that no laws should be passed which were
repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah. Many of the points rel-
ated to the economic life of Bengal, and it was proposed to
abolish Zamindari without compensation and distribute the
land to the peasants. There was also a section on civil
liberties, demanding the repeal of the Safety Acts, the
release of security prisoners and the safegaurding of the
rights of the press. The crucial item was point 19, the
demand for provincial autonomy: ’Secure all subjects, in-
cluding residuary powers, except Defence, Foreign Affairs
and Currency, for East Bengal, which shall be fully auton-
omous and sovereign as envisaged in the historic Lahore
resolution and establish Naval Headquarters and ordinance
factory in East Bengal so as to make it militarily self-
sufficient. ’
This was the first serious attempt on the part of East
Pakistan to make a demand for provincial autonomy, and it
met with considerable popular approval in the province,
even if it was regarded as radical by the ruling group.
The most important result was that the Muslim League was
completely swept out of power, the United Front won a sweep-
ing majority of 222 members in a House of 310 , after this
3 Kieth B. Callard, ojo. cit .
.
p. 73
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the Muslim League lost power in East Pakistan and was never
m a position to become the ruling party. However, this
unity presented by the United Front did not last long, due
to internal strife within the coalition and because of the
weakness of the leaders to implement their programs when
they came into power, the United Front broke up into differ-
ent parties the Awaimi League being one of them. In fact in
July 1957 the Awami League itself split in two - - one fact-
ion led by Maulana Bhashani supposed to be pro-Marxist and
anti-West in foreign policy and the other by H. S. Suhraw-
ardy supposed to be pro-West in foreign policy.
The Awami League from its beginning in 194-9 was mainly
an East Pakistani based party. It had propagated full region-
al autonomy for East Bengal and recognition of Bengali as
the national language. Suhrawardy ’s repeated efforts to make
it a national party were never quite effective. When Mujib-
ur Rahman assumed leadership of the Awami League, he made
no serious attempts to popularize it in the West. After the
death of Suhrawardy in 1963, the Awami League suffered a
leadership vacuum. Mujib was not the immediate successor
of Suhrawardy, for a while Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan from
West Pakistan was made the party president to play up the
Awami League’s national image. However, after the 1965
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election it seemed that the Awami League was losing ground,
it was then that Mujibur Rahman stepped forward as the
leader and felt the need to revitalize the party. Mujib
as such had no charisma, his emergence as a charismatic
figure only began when he came forward with his Six Points
formula for provincial autonomy in 1966, this also brought
the Awami League into the limelight. The Awami League’s
Six Points were:
1) The character of the Government shall be federal and
parliamentary, in which the election to the Federal
Legislature and to the legislature of the federating
units shall be direct and on the basis of universal
adult franchise. The representation in the federal
legislature shall be on the basis of population.
2) The Federal Government shall be responsible only for
defence and foreign affairs and subject to the conditions
provided in (3) below, currency.
3) There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely
convertible in each wing for each region, or in the alt-
ernative a single currency, subject to the establishment
of a federal reserve system in which there will be region-
al federal reserve banks which will devise measures to
prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital
from one region to another.
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4) Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the feder-
ating units. The federal government shall be provided
with requisite revenue resources for meeting the require-
ments of defence and foreign affairs, which revenue res-
ources would be automatically appropriable by the Federal
Government in the manner provided and on the basis of
the ratio to be* determined by the procedure laid down
in the Constitution. Such constitutional provisions
would ensure that Federal Government’s revenue require-
ments are met consistently with the objective of ensur-
ing control over the fiscal policy by the Governments
of the federating units.
5) Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate
accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnin-
gs of each of the federating units. The foreign exchange
requirements of the Federal Government shall be met by
the governments of the federating units on the basis of
a ratio to be determined in accordance with the procedure
laid down in the Constitution. The regional governments
shall have power under the constitution to negotiate
foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign
policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility
of the Federal Government.
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6) The Government of the federating units shall be empower-
ed to maintain militia or para-military force in order
to contribute effectively towards national security.^
The oix Point formula was not welcome as far as West
Pakistan was concerned. It “frightened his associates in
the West Pakistan opposition. Most of them feared the
proposal contained 'the seeds of national disintegration
and rejected it on that count alone. Others
,
perhaps more
sympathetic, found it unacceptable on the grounds that
it would invite government reprisals against the political
parties, and forty-four months of martial law had proved
to be a sobering experience. No one in West Pakistan wanted
a repetition of the 1958-62 period. And although they were
prepared to risk arrest in order to publicize their demands,
they were not interested in supporting a policy which, as
Ayub suggested might lead to civil war in the country."^
The Ayub regime’s response to the Six Points was rep-
ressive, as it always was towards any kind of opposition,
which tended to shake the stems of the already tottering
regime
.
The weakness of the Ayub regime was further demonstrated
Extract from Awami League Manifesto . Quoted in
Rushbrook L. Williams, The East Pakistan Tra.iedy
(London, 1972), Appendix 2. pp. 117-118
5 Ziring, op. cit .
.
p. 43
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in the so-called Agartala Conspiracy case. In December
1967 and January 1968 a number of East Pakistanis accused
of a secessionist plot were detained and Mujib was one of
them. Later on proceedings were held and an all out effort
was made to discredit and silence the man who at that time
seemed to best typify Bengali sentiment.
However, Ayub's repressive policies and his detaining
Mujib for the Agartala Conspiracy case, gave Mujib the
halo of martyrdom and his popularity increased. Finally,
when the Agartala Conspiracy case was withdrawn and Mujib
was released he was given a hero’s welcome and his role
as the champion of the Bengali rights was enhanced. Thus
Mujib' s appeal and his emergence to power was intertwined
with his Six Point formula, which also formed the basis
of the Awami League’s campaign for the 1970 elections.
On examining the Six Point formula, one finds that
it envisaged a system in which there would be a federal
government that only controlled defence and foreign policy,
and would therefore be unworkably feeble. A federation in
which the two wings had not merely separate economies but
separate currencies would create chaos. The federal govern-
ment was also not to have any taxing power of its own. it
would depend on provincial grants-in-aid. Moreover with
regard to free trade agreements, this would allow the East
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wing to have at least some trading arrangements with India,
in contradiction the federal policy, would continue to be
hawkishly anti-Indian. Furthermore it was a system which
would totally undermine the status of the army, making it
rely for its subventions on an economically independant
Fast wing. Such a system in practice would hit at the very
foundations of Pakistan. It was a demand for autonomy, that
would eventually lead to secession. Yet the paradox was
that while the Six Point formula went far beyond what the
center would conceivably grant, from the East Pakistan
point of view it was the least that they could demand. It
was a conflict in interests that had produced the Six Points,
and finally this conflict became irreconciliable and led
to the 1971 armed struggle between the two wings.
The situation in East Pakistan was appalling at the
time General Yahya Khan took over power on March 25, 1969 .
Mob rule and jungle law prevailed, the social fabric had
collapsed, and all recognised authority had disintegrated.
There was widespread student and labor disorder in East
Pakistan, West Pakistan was also on the verge of anarchy.
It was true that the East and the West shared little in
common, but it was their combined protests that eroded
the will of the Ayub regime to resist.
Inspite of the repressive measures of the Ayub regime
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the country had gone through a certain amount of change
and modernisation, several mobilised groups had emerged,
and had started asserting their rights. Although the mass
movements that had led to the downfall of Ayub Khan were
for the time being suppressed because of Martial Law, one
thing was clear, that Ayub had misplaced his priorities
and future governments of Pakistan could not afford to
commit the same mistake
.
President Yahya Khan soon after taking over power
disclaimed any political ambitions, in his broadcast on
March 31. he explained that he had to become Head of State
only to fulfil administrative and diplomatic obligations
3- new constitution was framed.^ Moreover in contrast
to the imposition of Martial Law in 1968 political parties
were not completely abolished, although their activities
were restricted,
Without much delay the new regime announced a new wage
policy and education policy, which aimed at appeasing the
demands of the two groups labor and students, which had
dominated the mass movements of 1968-69. Also to pacify
political parties, which was the other outstanding group
the regime promised an early return to democracy and const-
itutional rule. He also launched into a series of talks
with leaders of the various parties, of which there were
6 Pakistan Times . Lahore, April 1, 1969
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so many that they made the Pakistan political scene very
confusing.
On July 28, 1969 four months after taking over power,
President Yahya Khan appointed a chief election commission-
er, and promised elections within eighteen months. He told
the nation:
The banning of political parties and political
activity would not be in the interest of the
country
. It would make the task of administrat-ion a little simpler but would delay the achieve-
ments of our goal, the transfer of power to the
elected representatives of the people. It is mydeclared intention to usher in a sound and robustdemocratic system.^
He outlined some of the political problems the nation
faced. There were first too many political parties, and he
urged those of like views to merge, so as to reduce the
unmanageable number. Secondly, the President said there
were deep problems over the basis for the new elections
and the new parliament. The East wingers wanted voting on
the basis of population, which obviously give East Pakistan
a majority. Others from the West wing wanted the two wings
to have equal representation. He also made specific refer-
ence to the dissatisfaction of East Pakistan, he declared,
One of the reasons for dissatisfaction in the
East wing was a feeling that they were not being
allowed to play their full part in the decision-
making process at the national level and in
certain important spheres of national activity.
In my view they were fully justified in being
dissatisfied with this state of affairs.
g
7 Pakistan Times . Lahore, July 29 » 1969
8
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President Yahya Khan was sucessful to a certain extent,
he was able to dispel pessimism by inspiring a national
trust in his authority and integrity. For a martial law
regime all this was notably constructive and liberal minded.
The process for preparing for elections continued
smoothly, in August 1969 President Yahya Khan ordered the
preparation of electoral lists on the basis of universal
adult franchise. On November 28, 1969
,
the date was announ-
ced for election as October 5, 1970. The voters would
choose a constituent assembly, whose members would have a
limit of 120 days to frame a constitution, if this failed
the assembly would stand dissolved and new elections would
be held. There would be unrestricted political activity.
The President made three undertakings, first, voting would
be on the one man one vote principle, for the first time
in Pakistan’s history did this happen. This would give Fast
Pakistan a majority of votes since it has 55^ of the nations
population. Secondly in response to popular demand from
local interests in West Pakistan, the One Unit in West
Pakistan would cease to exist. This was also appealing to
the East Pakistani's as they had always been opposed to
the One Unit. Thirdly the two wings would have maximum
autonomy. This obviously meant it should be consistent
with the preservation of the integrity and solidarity of
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the nation. He also touched upon the problem of dividing
legislative and financial powers between the center and
the federating units; he saw no reason why the people of
East and West Pakistan, should not be able to work out a
plan which would satisfy the legitimate desire of the
federating units to control their economic resources and
development without adversely affecting the vital require-
ments of the nation as a whole.
On March 28, 1970 the President gave the nation the
long awaited details of his 'Legal Framework Order,” this
was a blueprint for a return to civilian government and the
creation of a parliamentary democracy. This framework the
President explained represented the best assessment that
he had been able to make of the wishes of the people of
Pakistan. The main features of the legal framework order
were: The total strength of the National Assembly was to
be 313 of whom 13 would be woman. Seats were allocated on
the basis of their population in the 1961-census-the latest
figures available. Parliamentary procedures would be settled
by the assembly itself; the President again pleaded that
the constitution was essentially an agreement to live to-
gether and that all the regions must be reasonably satis-
fied. This constitution he added, should embody certain
principles; the preservation of Islamic ideology; the
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preservation of independance
, territorial integrity and
national solidarity of Pakistan by means of a federal union,
founded on free and periodical elections, the independance
of the judiciary, fundamental civic rights, the distribut-
ion of legislative, financial and administrative powers
between the Federal government and the Provinces so that
the Provinces enjoyed maximum autonomy consistent with the
functions of the Central Government in internal and external
affairs, and that it must make statutory provision for
removing the economic disparity between the two wings. 9
This masterly plan seemed to be acceptable to every-
body, this was clear from- the Press coments, and also from
the speeches of the various political leaders, that all
parties were ready to accept it as a basis for the elections,
and it would also serve as a guideline for the National
Assembly.
Apparently it seemed that Yahya Khan was keen on going
back to soldiering and had no desire to retain political
office. Moreover the Yahya regime was well aware, that the
people could not be restrained for long by repressive
measures. It was just inevitable that there would be an
uprising against the new regime, if there was not a promise
of a return to civilian government in the near future.
However glancing at the situation in Pakistan at that time
9 White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan . August 1971 •
pp. 18-35
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one could see that there was not much chance of any one
party getting an absolute majority, thus the army still
had a fair chance, it could retain its stronghold as the
mediator and balancer.
ilujibur Rahman though in absolute control of his party
was not in absolute control of the political scene in East
Pakistan, which was his major constituency. He was facing
opposition from both the right and the left. It was easier
for him to deal with the right, which was in favor of a
strong center, thus it did not have a large following,
specially since the Six Points had become a Magna Carta
for the Bengali rights. It was the left that was more problem-
atic for Mujib, similar to the Awami League they also up-
held the Bengali cause, but their methods of achieving their
demands were more revolutionary and aggressive, they did
not have much faith in the constitutional methods. So
pressed against the leftest propaganda of the futility of
the electoral process, Mujib had to show that he could
win peoples rights without a revolution by participating
in the elections.
The election results, however, confounded everybody,
in East Pakistan the election results turned out to be a
referendum on the Awami League’s six points charter of
autonomy rather than a voters choice between viable alter-
natives. There were a number of reasons which cumulatively
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produced such a result. Mujib's strategy of trying to win
the maximum number of votes in East Pakistan was extremely
successful. Mujib had managed to gain support from almost
all the different groups in East Pakistan as their was a
combined resentment born out of a deep seated feeling of
political ineffectiveness and economic stagnation. Another
reason was also the withdrawal of the leftist forces from
the political arena. As a result of defections and internal
strife within the party, the National Awami Party was unable
to present itself as a viable alternative to the Awami
League and at the eleventh hour Maulana Bhashani decided
to boycot the election.
Another factor which contributed to the Awami League’s
landslide victory was the natural calamity, unprecedented
even for East Pakistan which, is so often hit by such disast-
ers. This cyclone was the worst of its kind, and the charge
of callousness levelled against the West-Pakistan dominated
center by East Pakistan, further added to East Pakistan's
resolve to give an overwhelming mandate to the Awami League
as the spokesman of its interests.
Mujib and his party won 167 out of 169 East Pakistani
seats.'*'
0
It was this absolute majority which triggered off
the constitutional crisis in Pakistan. The extent of the
10 Pakistan Times . Lahore, January 18, 1971
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Awami League’s victory had not been anticipated either by
the regime in Islamabad or by the League itself. It had
generally been expected that the League would secure a
large majority of the East Pakistan seats, but not such a
clean sweep that it made. Had the Awami League been able
to secure about 115 to 120 seats, it would still have bean
far short of a majority in the National Assembly, and this
would have forced the League to make compromises in order
to gain the support of certain West Pakistan elements so
as to frame the constitution and form the Central Govern-
ment. Even more important the League would then have been
able to justify any compromises it might have had to make.
The election results upset all such calculations, the
massive mandate that the Awami League received converted
its six point program into the minimum, non-negotiable
demands of East Pakistan, and the Awami League now reflect-
ing the mood of the entire province became the prisoner of
its own victory.
Looking at the political scene in West Pakistan one
found that Bhutto was just about the strongest political
force. His electoral strategy was to pull all the anti-
regime forces together, and specially to exploit the new
social groups and their demands which were brought t6 the
surface during the mass movements in 1968-1969. He always
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kept his party's platform rather vague. During election
eering Bhutto refrained from criticizing the Six Points,
because he wanted to keep maximum options open in his
bargaining with the Awami League. 11
Bhutto's main aim was to get as many votes as possible,
so that he could have a strong bargaining position vis a
vis other parties
-specially the Awami League. The election
results left Bhutto with the greatest freedom of action.
His dominance of the two most populous provinces, Punjab,
and Sind, placed him in a strong bargaining position with
the Awami League and the military. On the other hand the
emergence of a strong West Pakistani party with a flamboy-
ant and strong leader like Bhutto with the right to speak
for almost 2/3rds of West Pakistan, built into the situation
all the elements of a deadlock.
The election result, was in a paradoxical way too
good too clear cut. It created not merely a two-party
assembly but a two nation assembly; it further emphasised
the separateness of the two wings, moreover by being separate-
ly represented they were further polarized. But if the
assembly was to be made workable, there had to be some
consensus, and a certain amount of accomadation between the
two major parties, niether of them could afford to go ahead
without some form of support from the other.
11 Zulfikar A. Bhutto, The Great Trajedy (Karachi,
1971), PP. 18-20
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It was now time for the post-election talks, Mujib
having refused all offers to go to West Pakistan for talks,
made it essential for the leaders in the West to go to
Mujib for bargaining. Apparently Bhutto's visit to Dacca
was not too rewarding, his attempts at power sharing were
rejected by Mujib. Bhutto finding himself outmanoevred by
by Mujib’s uncompromising atitude over the Six Points,
announced on February 17, 1971 his decision to boycott the
proposed National Assembly session of March 2, 1971.^
Mujib refused to come to any settlement outside the
National Assembly as Bhutto demanded, though in an apparent
response to Bhutto's apprehension about the Six Points,
Mujib declared that they would not be imposed on West Pak-
istan and that any reasonable alternative would be consider-
ed by the Awami League in the National Assembly. 1 -^
Soon after Bhutto decided to put his revolutionary
foot forward. In a largely attended public meeting in Lahore
on February 28, 1971 » Bhutto called for the observance of
a strike from'Khyber to Karachi’ on March 2nd, the opening
day of the Assembly. He threatened the West Pakistani members
participating in the Assembly that he would call on the
people of Pakistan to take full revenge on them, and should
the people fail to take revenge member of the Peoples Party
Dawn
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would do the same.^
The postponement of the National Assembly session
sparked off a spontaneous rebellious mood in East Pakistan.
Bhutto and Yahya 's allegations that Mujib over reacted to
the postponement of the National Assembly session, show
their misperception of the Bengali mood.
When Yahya' s 'announcement of the postponement of the
National Assembly session was heard in Dacca mid day March
1, 1971 » there was an immediate spontaneous strike. People
left their work to join processions to protest the action.
Mujib seeing the rebellious mood of the people made his
first response to Yahya' s action by condemning the post-
ponement of the Assembly he called for ageneral strike on
March 3» 1971. The city of Dacca was paralysed by this strike.
Shops, factories, offices were closed as well as schools
and colleges. Thousands of angry citizens and students "
roamed the streets of Dacca, stoning English and Urdu
language signs, looting stores and burning cars. 1 ^
The postponement of the National Assembly session
angered the Bengalis, thay looked upon this act as one more
example of West Pakistan imposing its will on East Pakistan.
The National Assembly session was postponed to accomodate
Bhutto a West Pakistani even though he was the leader of
Dawn
.
Karachi, March 1, 1971
15 Ibid. March 1, 1971
44
a minority party, and overlooking the protests of Mujib
a Bengali, who was the leader of a majority party, this meant
flouting all democratic principles. The postponement was
also interpreted as an indication of the regime opting for
a military solution, because along with the postponement
announcement, the Governor of East Pakistan Ahsan was
relieved of his duties, and General Yaqub the GOG was named
the Governor and Martial Law Administrator.
Yahya Khan in alast minute attempt to resolve the
country's constitutional crisis, called a Round Table
Conference in Dacca to iron out the major differences
between the Eastern and the Western province. He hoped that
the Constituent Assembly could be called within weeks if
the leaders came to an understanding. On the contrary as
violence and a total strike paralysed East Pakistan, Mujib
called upon the East Pakistanis to confront the Central
1
6
Government in all spheres.
Before the meeting of the Round Table Conference
Sheikh Mujib offered rather stiff terms to Yahya Khan.
Addressing a public gathering in Dacca he declared, he would
enter the Constituent Assembly only if Yahya Khan met four
demands: the immediate transfer of power to the elected
representatives of the people; the withdrawal of Martial
Law; the return of troops to their barracks; an inquiry
into the mass killing in East Pakistan. Hefurther asserted
16 The Times. London, March 4, 1971
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that a non-co-operation movement would be launched through-
out the province. All government offices would be closed
and no taxes would be paid.
1
”'7
On March 15* 1971 Yahya Khan came to Dacca to try
to work out a political settlement of the crisis. However
Bhutto did not accept Yahya* s invitation to join the Dacca
talks. Detailed information about the Mujib-Yahya talks
is not available, but apparently it seemed that some kind
3- ft agreement was arrived at for an interim arrangement
for a transfer of power. Pakistan's newspapers from March
18 to 23 rd, gave rather optimistic reports about the pros-
pects of a political settlement. In fact Mujib himself
told reporters that progress was made in his talks with
Yahya. 18
Bhutto was not pleased with such an arrangement, his
demand was that if there was an interim arrangement for
transfer of power it had to be given to the two majority
parties, the Peoples Party and the Awami League. 1^In fact
on March 19th, Bhutto issued a threatening statement that
a sell out of West Pakistan would not be tolerated and
20the Peoples Party would prepare for action.
On March 20, 1971 » the advisors of Yahya Khan and
Sheikh Mujib agreed on a draft proclamation to be issued
1
^ The Times . London, March 8, 1971
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by Yahya Khan which contained the outlines of the interim
arrangement for the transfer of power. The proclamation
consisted of 13 points.
The proposed proclamation provided for an immediate
withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power to the
five provinces without such power transfer in the center.
It also provided for the division of the National Assembly
into two committees to frame separate reports on the basis
of which the constitution could be framed. Autonomy granted
to East Pakistan was on the basis of the six points while
the quantum of autonomy for the other four provinces was
left to their mutual arrangement
.
21
Bhutto arrived in Dacca on March 21st, on meeting
Yahya Khan he expressed his reluctance to accept the draft
proclamation. He not only made alternative suggestions,
but also asked for more time which would give him an
opportunity to negotiate directly with Mujib
.
22
Meanwhile pressure was already building on Mujib,
and the leftist forces were getting out of hand. In many
parts of Dacca, the supporters of the left wing National
Awami Party celebrated * independance day* on March 13, in
an attempt to wrest initiative from the Awami League, which
was busy negotiating. In order to understand why the Awami
21 Government of Pakistan: White Paper on the Crisis
in East Pakistan (Islamabad, 1971), pp. 19-20
22 Dawn
. Karachi, March 23. 1971
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League was not willing to prolong the negotiations demanded
by Bhutto and Yahya: one has to see that it was becoming
more and more difficult for Mujib to contain the pressure
form diverse forces. As the days went by and no significant
reconciliation was forthcoming, the demand for immediate
declaration of independance got credence. Mujib was being
pressurized not only from other parties but also from
radicals from within his own party.
By the middle of March the students were becoming
extremely militant, and the situation built up to such
a stage, that the army had to be moved in to establish
law and order, and to prevent East Pakistan’s attempts
towards secession, thus started the tragic vendetta bet-
ween the army and the East Pakistani secessionists.
The constitutional crisis in Pakistan could not be
resolved because the leaders failed to accommodate each
other and find a mutually acceptable formula. Both Mujib
and Bhutto were interested in a transfer of power, and yet
they were not able to present a united front to the milit-
ary regime. The support that they received form their resp-
ective constituencies put a great deal of restraint on their
reaching an independant compromise. Mujib found it impossible
to modify his Six Points, on the basis of which he had
won the elections, Bhutto had no such clear cut formula
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so he was in a better bargaining position. Moreover he was
also under some pressure from his constituency who were so
long out of power, and were not willing to sit in the oppos-
ition for the next few years. It was also psychologically
unacceptable for Bhutto and the West Pakistani leadership
to be dominated by Sheikh Mujib. The conflict between
Bhutto and Mujib left the military once again in a command-
ing position. President Yahya tried to shift the blame from
one to the other. However, it is true that as the crisis
was mounting, Yahya did try to make earnest efforts to
find a solution. He also used a great deal of constraint
in dealing with the law and order situation in East Pakistan,
until he was forced to take action to preserve the solidarity
and integrity of Pakistan. Unfortunately enough the leaders
of Pakistan miscalculated the drastic consequences which
could result from their failure to accommodate one another.
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CHAPTER III
INDIA AND THE PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR
PHASE I
No discussion on the emergence of Bangla Desh can be
regarded as complete, without giving due importance to the
part played by India throughout the crisis in East Pakistan.
It is important, because India’s intervention in the politic-
al and constitutional problem of Pakistan not only intensified
old antagonisms between the two countries, bu it also accel-
erated the issue, and made it impossible for Pakistan to
arrive at a political settlement of some kind.
The two countries have always looked upon one another
as enemies since their independence, and their relations
with each other have always been charged with an envenomed
load of bigotary, prejudice, religious and nationalistic
hostility. This discord has weakened the economy of both
countries, and has from time to time, passed from a state
of cold war to actual conflict.
The present day Indo-Pakistan tension is a prolongat-
ion of the Hindu-Muslim tension that characterized India
long before independence and partition. The creation of
partition was the culmination of a long struggle on the
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part of the muslims, a minority community in the sub-cont-
inent endeavouring to safegaurd its social and cultural
identity which was in many ways distinct and different
form that of the Hindus, who were the majority community.
Those who had fought for Pakistan had struggled hard to
compel recognition that the muslims were a separate nation
and should have a territorial state. The two nation theory
was not acceptable to the Congress and the Indian leaders;
for them partition meant the vivisection of the motherland.
However, after a great deal of political haggling, the
sub-continent was split with mutual consent, but not without
mental reservations on the part of the Indian leaders.
The tragic events before and after partition made good
relations between the two countries almost impossible. The
communal murder and mass migration gave them the worst
possible start. Hardly were the effects of the calamity
overcome, when fresh sources of political and economic
friction appeared. India used military force to settle the
accession of three princely states: Junagadh, Hyderabad,
and Kashmir. In fact the Kashmir dispute which still rem-
ains unsolved has effected the relations between the two
countries so seriously that it is responsible for their
failure to reach agreement on any major issues, infact it
has twice led to war in 19^8 and then again in 1965.
Pakistanis see Indo-Pakistan tension as a result of
India’s unwillingness to respect Pakistan as a sovereign
state and accept the reality of her existence. "The Indian
rulers," said Ayub Khan in denouncing the Indian armed
attack on September 6, 1965» "were never reconciled to the
establishment of an independant Pakistan, where Muslims
could build a homeland of their own. All their military
preparations have been directed against us."^
Pakistan’s fear and mistrust of India's intentions
have been further strengthened, by India’s reactions and
atitude in the East Pakistan crisis. When the Yahya govern-
ment used military force to suppress Mujib’s secessionist
movement in east Pakistan. The Indian press launched a
massive anti-Pakistan drive which led a diplomat to remark,
"There are two wars in East Pakistan the war we hear about
through channels and the war we read about in the Indian
2press .
"
However, India's reactions were not limited to the
press alone. There were outspoken speeches by all Indian
leaders, in fact the sentiments expressed by the Indian
Prime Minister and the Indian Government encouraged the
press, political parties, and other influential circles
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to toe the government line. Gradually as the crisis deep-
ened India's reactions became stronger. The Indian response
proceeded from sympathy for the secessionists to provision
of sanctuaries, encouragement was provided in the form of
funds, training, weapons and other supplies. Later on it
seemed that Indian troops might also be used to aid the
secessionists after they had siezed some key areas and
hamstrung the Pakistan army. In the end India did use her
armed force to defeat the Pakistan army in East Pakistan
and to bring about Bangla Desh.
In this chapter I will try and analyse India’s initial
reactions to the crisis in East Pakistan, and the atitude
adopted by the Indian Government, political parties, the
press and the public.
The campaign conducted by the Awami League for the
1970 elections was warmly supported from India. The election
results and Mujibur Rahman’s victory were widely hailed,
and some members of the Parliament issued a joint state-
ment saying, "East Pakistanis have massively reciprocated
through the ballot box the sentiments of the majority of
Indians and given a fitting reply to those elements in
Pakistan who have made hate-India the main plank of their
election campaign."^
3 The Statesman
. December 9# 1970
53
Mujib’s demand for maximum autonomy was obviously on
the right lines from India’s point of view, and so long as
tnere was hope of Mujib becoming the leader of Pakistan,
India regarded the developments in Pakistan as an internal
matter. On March 2, 1971 an official spokesman of the Exter-
nal Affairs Ministry in New Delhi was reported by All India
Radio as saying that India regarded the developments in
Pakistan as purely an internal affair of the country.
however, as the law and order situation deteriorated in
East Pakistan, and the Pakistan Government felt impelled
to call in the army to cope with the situation. The following
day, that is March 15, 1971, the government of India declar-
ed its intention to put a ban on overflights across Indian
territory between East and West Pakistan. The ban was total
in the case of military aircraft irrespective of its national
origin. The government of India had already banned Pakistan
civilian flights over its territory in early February because
of the hijacking of an Indian plane that was destroyed by
the hijackers at Lahore airport. India accused the Pakistan
government of complicity and took a unilateral action. This
had the effect of cutting off air communications between
East and West Pakistan. Later, India also refused permission
to some non-Pakistani aircrafts which touched Karachi to
fly over Indian territory.^ This decision of the Indian
4
The Statesman
.
March 16, 1971
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Government to put a complete ban on overflights was taken
without any prima-facie cause. The ban certainly cramped
Islamabad's capacity to put down the Awami League non-
co-operation movement. Instead Pakistan aircraft had to
fly to Dacca via Ceylon which increased the distance and the
operational cost several fold.
On the night of March 25, 1971, Yahya Khan ordered a
military crackdown to prevent East Pakistan's drift towards
secession. Columns of the Pakistan army moved to establish
control in all big cities of East Pakistan. India no longer
regarded the developments in Pakistan as an internal matter.
As news reached of battles between President Yahya Khan's
troops and Bengali civilians, left wingers of the Indian
Parliament interrupted the proceedings on the afternoon
of March 26, 1971* to demand that New Delhi should extend
full moral support to East Pakistan in its struggle against
military oppression. It was even suggested by one member that
India should raise the matter in the United Nations and
arrange for overland transit facilities for Bengalis in
fear of their lives in West Pakistan.^
Pakistan Government protested against what it called
India's deliberate and blatant interference in Pakistan’s
internal affairs, and complained about All India Radio
-
'
-5 Washington Post . March 27* 1971
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giving exaggerated,
-malicious” and "provacative" stories
about the situation in East Pakistan.
On March 28, 1971 there was a big debate in the Indian
Parliament in which members denounced Yahya’s military
crackdown. Mrs Gandhi indicated to Parliament that India
was considering the possibility of assisting the East Beng-
alis, although she' did not make any commitment. She said,
"We are alive to the situation and we shall keep constantly
in touch with what is happening and what we need to do."'
“‘any members of the Parliament including some from her own
Congress Party urged immediate recognition of independant
Bangla Desh.^
Mrs Gandhi a shrewd politician was not in favor of
immediate recognition by India, at this stage it would
divert attention form Pakistan’s actions in East Pakistan
to India's open intervention in the crisis. Also when it
was possible for India to give the required support to the
Bangla Desh movement without recognition, there was not
much point in doing so until world opinion had also been
moulded to favor the recognition of Bangla Desh.
It was not long before the Indian Parliament expressed
solidarity with East Bengalis in concrete terms. On March 31,
Mrs Gandhi moved a resolution in both the Houses assuring
6 Washington Post
.
March 28, 1971
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the people of Bangla Desh of India’s whole-hearted support,
and expressed confidence in the triumph of the movement,
The House records its profound conviction that the
historical upsurge of the 75 million people of East
Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them
that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the
whole-hearted sympathy and support of the people of
India. This House calls upon all peoples and Govern-
mants of the world to take urgent and constructive
steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan
to put an end to the systematic decimation of people
which amounts to genocide.^
Besides debating the issue and passing resolutions in
Parliament, the members also staged a demonstration outside
the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi. They reused multi-
lingual slogans, demanding, ’Let the will of the people
prevail. • ’Hands off Bangla Desh.* They read out a memorandum
demanding immediate withdrawal of all West Pakistani troops
from East Pakistan. Seven leading MP’s called on Ceylon's
High Commissioner and urged the Ceylonese Government to
deny landing and refuelling facilities to Pakistan air-
Q
craft flying troops to East Pakistan.
On April 14, Mrs Gandhi issued a statement saying that
India could not remain a silent spectator to what was happen
ing in Bangla Desh; it would have repurcussions in her
country. The partition of Bengal had adverselly affected
the people of West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, and Manipur.
^The Statesman . April 1, 1971
8 Ibid . . March 30, 1971
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But the cultural affinity and the relations between the
two people still existed. 9
Meanwhile the Pakistan army had tightened control and
had moved in to crush the provisional government of Bangla
Desh operating form Chuadanga. As the army columns moved
m, the Bangla Desh ’government' moved from Chuadanga to
Meherpur which is-right on the Indian border. A week later
the leaders of the Bangla Desh 'government' were lodged at
the West Bengal Government Guest House in downtown Calcutta.
"Indian officers in civilian clothes arranged the ceremony
in which the provisional government made its first public
appearance, and the Indian military camps along the border
are giving shelter to rebel soldiers without disarming
them.
"
10
As a result of the Pakistan military action a large
number of refugees from East Pakistan moved to India. There
is some evidence that to begin with, India encouraged this
exodus as providing material for the psychological campaign
against Pakistan in the world's capitals, by attributing
their plight to the brutal suppression by the Pakistan army.
It is true that the condition in East Pakistan was chaotic,
resulting from the armed conflict between the Pakistan army.,
and the rebellious forces of East Pakistan, means of commun-
ication had been destroyed, food was scarce, and many people
o
Hindustan Times
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out of fear crossed the border to India in the hope of
finding safety and sustenance. Moreover India's friendly
and sympathetic overtures, a continuous stream of propaganda
emanating from the West Bengal press and All India Radio
regarding the awful fate that these people would meet by
the advancing Pakistan army, encouraged people to flee.
As to the number of refugees actually involved it is
not possible to speak with accuracy. It was of course to
the advantage of the Indian authorities to inflate their
numbers in order to encourage assistance from foreign govern-
ments, and condemn Pakistan. From an initial estimate of
two to three million, the figures publicized by India stead-
ily mounted, to an incredible statement that refugees were
crossing the border at the rate of one million a day. The
whole issue of refugees gave India a chance and a raison
d’etre for its intervention in the East Pakistan crisis.
A massive case was made about the refugee influx and appeals
were made for aid to support them. In the Assembly of the
World Congress in Budapest, the 700 delegates heard with
rapt attention the appeal of the Indian delegates for world
support to the East Bengali struggle. Mrs Gandhi said,
Nearly two million refugees have already poured
into our country posing a heavy burden on us,
Pakistan must be held responsible to create with-
out delay conditions which will enable those
refugees to return to their own country safely and
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with honour. I hope that all peoples of the world
^
nd
. ^
efend human rights and demand the
rSJ° ^
he p?ople of £ast Bengal of theirclaim to rule by "their elected representat-
India represented herself to the world as an unselfish
humanitarian Power, primarily interested in mitigating an
appalling human catastrophe. But it did not go unnoticed
that she saw the r-ast Pakistan crisis as an opportunity to
break up Pakistan. To this end she encouraged to the utmost
her ability, the creation of a separate Bangla Desh out
of the Eastern Wing of Pakistan.
On May 15 , 1971, the government of India sent a note
to the Pakistan High Commission, bluntly asking Pakistan
to create such conditions in East Pakistan immediately as
would enable the return of refugees to their homes. An
interesting reference in the note was of India "re serving
the right to claim full satisfaction in respect of financ-
ial and other burdens" is liable to several interpretations.
Apart from demanding compensation in terms of money, the
government could legitimately ask for a territorial adjust-
ment on the basis of population of which there were several
12precedents
.
On the same day Mrs Gandhi, addressing a huge gathering
at Mohanpur, a few miles from Agartala expressed the hope
11 The Statesman
.
May 15, 1971
12 Ibid
. .
May 16, 1971
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that the struggle of the people of Bangla Desh would not
be in vain, and that they would ultimately achieve indep-
endance and form a democratic government. 1 -^ India's Prime
Minister was giving the lead to adopting a militant atitude
towards Pakistan, so as to try and force it to come to a
solution favourable to the interests of India.
Mrs Gandhi Said in Parliament that the possibility
of a political settlement in East Pakistan was becoming
more remote everyday. She said the problem besides refugees,
also involved the issue of democracy and human rights,
she declared however, that India would never acquiese, "in
a political settlement, that means the death of Bangla Desh
and the ending of democracy and of the people who are fight-
ing for their rights.” 1 ^
The Indian Prime Minister was rather disappointed,
that in spite of all the propaganda through the press,
mass-media and her own appeals and protests the world
community was not taking any action. She accused the
World Powers of not doing enough about the civil war in East
Pakistan and said India would have to "take all means
necessary to ensure our own security and for the preserv-
ation of the structure of social and economic life." She
The Statesman
.
May 16, 1971
^ The New York Times . June 16, 1971
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did not elaborate, but she hinted strongly that a military
solution was not ruled out. 1 -^
The Indian government still not satisfied with the
state of world opinion on the issue decided to send its
Foreign Minister to the principal world capitals in June
1971 to ensure that the Indian point of view was represented
effectively in the highest quarters. "The aim was to acquaint
foreign governments of the dangerous implications of the
Yahya regime's repressive policies in East Bengal. His
intenerary was to include Bonn, Paris, Eondon, Washington,
and Ottawa. Some of these countries were members of the
16
Aid to Pakistan Consortium."
He also tried to impress on these governments the
dangers of giving economic aid to Pakistan now that one
half of the country was under army occupation, and that help
from abroad would only be used to suppress the aspirations
of the people of Bangla Desh. Mr Swaran Singh said. "My
thesis is that to give aid to Pakistan military leaders
before they apply correctives in East Pakistan is interfer-
ing in Pakistan's domestic affairs, it means giving aid
to a minority, a dictatorial regime." However, this all
out diplomatic and publicity campaign to mobilize world
pressure on Pakistan did not get the response India expected.
^
^
Washington Post . May 25t 1971
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The reactions of most governments to the events in
East Pakistan was to regard them as an internal matter of
Pakistan. This atitude was consistently maintained by the
Arab World, the South bast Asian countries, the Chinese
Republic, Turkey and Iran. Initially France was also not
receptive to the Indian line but changed later on. Great
Britain in the beginning was not favourable. The Indian press
itself reported "that Mr Swaran Singh's talks here will be
crucial because the British Government's view of events in
Pakistan is not the same as India’s. Whitehall still hopes
that Pakistan will survive as one unit in a loose federation.
While Ahitehall is happy over the opportunity of discussing
the problem with Mr Swaran Singh, it has reservations on
what India would like to see happen." 17 Subsequently, the
British Givernment changed its mind and its atitude towards
Islamabad became most unfriendly.
In the United States many Democratic leaders called for
a cessation of all aid to Pakistan until the desired polit-
ical settlement was reached. President Nixon's Administrat-
ion however, resisted the pressure. The U.S.S.H supported
India’s point of view almost right from the beginning. Soviet
Premier, Mr Alexei Kosygen, addressing an election rally
called for conditions to be created to enable millions of
17 The Statesman
. June 20, 1971
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East Bengal refugees who have flooded India to return to
their homeland. He said the situation in the Indian sub-
continent : caused anxiety to the Soviet Government. He called
for measures to be taken without delay for the return of
1 R
refugees
.
The different political parties in India supported
the movement for ah independant Bangla Desh. The Revolut-
ionary Socialist Party's General Secretary, Tardib Chaudhury,
asked for immediate diplomatic recognition. 10 The Jana
Sangh Party member K.L. Gupta wanted the government to enforce
a naval blockade to prevent Pakistani ships carrying arms
and ammunition to East Pakistan. 20 The Jana Sangh even
decided to observe April 25, as 'Swadhin Bangla Day through-
out the country to express the solidarity of the people of
India with the freedom fighters in East Bengal. 21
The Samgukta Socialist Party decided to call a World
Conference to spotlight the situation in Bangla Desh. They
were convinced that the conscience of the world would be
op
roused only by a global conference on Bangla Desh. The
Communist Party of India members in Parliament suggested
that refugees should be given training in arms so that they
23
might go back to Bangla Desh to fight the Pakistani troops. J
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The Communist Party leader »r A. K. Gopalan also suggested
that India should supply arms to Liberation forces in Bangla
Desh.
The Bharatiya Kranti Dal said in a resolution on Bangla
Desh that India demand territories from Pakistan to rehabil-
itate East Bengal refugees
.
25 Even among the ruling Congress
Party, there was a- great demand for an early recognition
of Bangla Desh.
The Indian press espoused the Bangla Desh cause most
vehemently and, in the press freely reported to exaggerat-
ion. Once all the foreign journalists had been expelled
from nast Pakistan, because of the uncertain conditions
there, India became the major source about the happenings
in bast Pakistan. India’s reporters were closest to the
news, but the newspapers turned themselves into propaganda
organs no less crude than the government controlled press
in rakistan. Day after day, in defiance not merely of known
facts but also of reason and consistency, the newspapers
announced great victories by the Mukti Bahini forces fighting
the Pakistan army,, its capture of towns and large areas of
tiast Pakistan. Several newspapers, including the reputed
Times of India, headlined the news of Dacca's liberation
23
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and surrender of an entire Pakistan division. Soon incon-
sistencies began to crop up, and not being able to back up
their earlier reports that Dacca had been liberated, the
same newspapers carried the stories warning that a second
round of heavy fighting was coming,
^
Needless to say, the press supported the Indian govern-
ment’s course of action. A Statesman editorial commenting
on the resolution passed by the Indian Parliament said
Parliament has fully conveyed the depth of the nat-ion’s feelings but it has not committed the govern-
ment to any course of action which is premature
.
The resolution recognises that East Bengal has in
effect ceased to be J2.ast Pakistan but stops short
of immediately recognising its independance by call-ing it Bangla Desh. Indeed short of rushing into
an official committment with far reaching implicat-
ions, India has expressed full support for a' people
subjected to repression by a cynical and shortsighted
military regime.
On the issue of recognition of Bangla Desh, some newspapers
favored the government atitude of ambivalence for a variety
of reasons such as:
a) India was not keen to give Islamabad a handle to divert
world attention from the enormity of the problem the
Pakistan army was facing.
b) The somewhat surprising Chinese atitude on East Bengal
had introduced a new dimensions.
c) It was felt that recognition of Bangla Desh at that stage
would not particularly help Sheikh Mujib’s followers in
26 Washington Post
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their struggle.
d) New Delhi was viewing the recognition issue also in the
context of its total repurcussions on Indo-Pakistan
relations with the world.
Whereas some newspapers cautioned the government about
a premature recognition others advocated immediate recognit-
ion. A distinguished Indian scholar, Mr. Mohammed Ayoob,
wrote
,
In such a situation the recognition of Bangla Desh,
even if some people consider it premature, will only
mean coming to grips with the inevitable. It is my
plea that once a provisional government is firmly
established with territory under its control, we
should lead the way rather than become the tradit-
ional fourth or fifth nation to recognise the new
government. If we alienate the people of East Bengal
by withholding recognition a minute longer than
necessary, we may be faced with two hostile countries
instead of one. A domestic variable should also be
considered. As it is, West Bengal considers itself
the disinherited state. With emotions raised to fever
pitch in West Bengal, any hesitation on the part of
New Delhi may add disenchantment in West Bengal. The
myth that if we recognise Bangla Desh, West Bengal
may also go the Dacca way should be exploded. In
fact it is the non-recognition of Bangla Desh by
New Delhi which may alienate West Bengal . 28
28 Hindustan Times. April 10, 1971
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besides the press coverage which was building public
opinion to a high pitch, different public groups and polit-
ical notables also gave vent to their feelings, Meetings
were organised to discuss the East Bengal situation. Mr N.
G. Chatter ji
, President of the All India Civil Liberties
Council, issued a statement calling upon the government of
India to take concrete steps to recognise the liberation
movement in Bangla Desh, 2 ^ At a discussion on 'Recent Events
in Pakistan* organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs
in New Delhi, the consensus was that India should forget so
called diplomatic niceties, throw doubtful caution to the
winds, and go to help Bangla Desh in whatever way possible.-^ 0
In Calcutta, where emotions were high, political parties,
trade unions and citizens formed a committee, with Chief
Minister A joy Mukerjee as its President, to help the freedom
struggle in Bangla Desh. A resolution adopted at a meeting
urged the union government to give diplomatic recognition
to Bangla Desh.'* 1
A deputation of the Indo-Bangla Desh Friendship Assoc-
iation led by its General Secretary Mr. A. Das Gupta visited
the embassies of the U.S,A and the U.S.S.R and the British
High Commission, and handed over memoranda urging their
governments to intervene in Bangla Desh. While the deputation
Hindustan Times
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was received by senior officials at the United States and
the Soviet embassies the British High Commission refused
to meet its members according to a spokesman of the assoc-
iation.^ 2
Meanwhile as there were rumours about Mujibur Rahman's
trial coming up soon, the Avadh Bar Association came for-
ward with an appeal, that the Pakistan government should be
pursuaded not to place any obstacles in the legal defence
of Mujib. If the Bangla Desh leader was made to stand trial
and to agree to the appointment of lawyers of international
repute to defend him their services should be obtained. The
world should take up the cause of defending Mujib, and secure
his trial by an impartial tribunal; any tribunal constituted
by Pakistan could not be fair nor impartial. 33
A number of other political notables pressed their
views on the Bangla Desh issue, the most vocal of them was
tor Jayaprakash Narayan. Mr Narayan is the leading spokesman
of the Gandhian point of view in India. He is also one of
the Indian leaders with a record over the years of having
spoken for conciliation and compromise with Pakistan. But
during the Pakistan crisis he got busy touring world capitals
trying to pursuade the various governments to cut off all
form of foreign assistance to Pakistan. He tried to generate
32 The Statesman
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international outrage over the denial of self-determination
to the Bengalis of East Pakistan by the Pakistan army. »l
have been very deeply hurt by what the government of Pakistan
has done," he said in an interview at the Indian Counsulate
m New York, "it is something like what Hitler did." 34
The first stop of his unofficial mission was Cairo,
where he failed in' his attempt to meet any important figures
m ^resident Sadat’s Government. He said this was because
of the crisis in Egypt but many Indians think this is not
so. It was perhaps a matter of one Muslim country supporting
another. He met Yasir Arafat the Palestinian commando leader
who he said was bubbling with support for Bangla Desh. Later
Mr Narayan conferred with President Tito of Yugoslavakia,
Pope Paul VI and Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany.
He also stopped in Moscow, Helsinki, Paris and London,
before arriving in Washington, where he met Joseph Sisco,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, and Henry Kissenger. He argued against the
contention of Western officials that a total halt in aid
to Pakistan would end any constructive influence they might
have in the crisis. On the contrary he told them 'putting
screws' on Pakistan would make it impossible for the milit-
ary regime to continue its operations against the Bengalis.
34 New York Times. June 13, 1971
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Giving aid, he contended, would involve the donor nations"in
the guilt of the Pakistan army''
.
3 ^
It was apparent that his attempts at influencing world
opinion were no crashing success. Replying to questions in
a Delhi television interview he said that India would have to
resolve the problem of refugees on her own without depending
on the world community,''
The former Indian Defence Minister, Mr . V.K .Krishna Menon,
urged the government to recognise the Bangla Desh government
•
• 37immediately. A former Indian Foreign Minister, Mr.M. C. Chagla,
also called for early recognition of Bangla Desh
.
38
The student community of India reacted strongly to the
happenings in East Pakistan. The Delhi University Students’
Union called for a token strike to express solidarity towards
the people of Bangla Desh
.
39 In Shillong, the joint capital
of Assam and Meghalya, students abstained from classes and
paraded the streets of the city demanding the recognition
of Bangla Desh. They demonstrated opposite the Assam Legis-
lative Assembly and urged the union government to rush troops
. 40to fight against the West Pakistanis.
33 New York Times. June 13* 1971
3 ^ The Statesman. June 29* 1971
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Eminent writers, artists and painters employed their
talents to show sympathy for Bangla Desh. They sponsored a
mobile exhibition to spread awareness among the people of the
situation in Bangla Desh. Through photographs and sketches
the horror and sorrow, the pain and struggle and the courage
of the Bengalis was vividly brought home to the shoppers
and strollers in India’s towns.
It is apparent from the above that the creation of
Bangla Desh, and the dismemberment of Pakistan, had become
a national objective in India. One cannot say that it was
the refugee problem that caused reactions in India, because
it is clear that the Indian official and public view had
crystallized and hardened before the refugee problem assumed
the magnitude that it subsequently did. It is true however
that the refugees provided a justification for India’s atti-
tude
.
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CHAPTER IV
INDIA AND THE PAKISTAN CIVIL WAR
PHASE II
By June, 1971' India’s policy on East Bengal had taken
recognisable shape, India sought Big Power involvement and
chided the international community for having shirked res-
ponsibility so far
.
At the same time it defined the extent
of its own involvement, and gave notice to Pakistan that if
the situation in and around East Bengal did not improve,
Islamabad would have to take the consequences. Uptil now
if the Indian Government shrank from more effective inter-
vention it was only because such a threat looked rather aca-
demic
.
The situation on the border as such was extremely ex-
plosive. Hidden in tent camps along East Pakistan's western
border with India were the official armed forces of the rebel
Bangla Desh Government, the Mukti Bahini. Some regular Ind-
ian Army units, ignoring an Indo-Pakistan treaty under which
both sides were to keep their forces five miles from the
border, had moved in right besides the Mukti Bahini. "It is
easy to understand the ease with which Pakistani troops in
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hot pursuit of retreating guertillas could find to their
cost that they had invaded India.
Meanwhile Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, making a major
policy statement on behalf of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
government, told Parliament that a new nation of Bangla Desh
will ultimately be established in what is now East Pakistan.
High ranking Indian officials said the position outlined
by him was based on the Indian government's recognition that
the Bangla Desh movement was not an idle dream and had the
potentiality of success. 2
The crisis further deepened when the Indian government
and the provincial government of Bangla Desh rejected Presi-
dent Yahya's new formula for the transfer of power, soon
after the Pakistan leader made a marathon speech to the nation.
The President had announced that a group of experts would
draw up a constitution for Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly
would be converted into a national assembly, elected members
from the banned Awami League party would be allowed to take
their seats, and a by election held for vacant seats. Within
minutes of the announcement, Mr. Swaran Singh, the Indian
Foreign Minister, told Parliament that the "government of
Washington Post. June 21, 1971
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India would reject any makeshift plan for a transfer of
power which did not take the elected leader of Pakistan
Shaikh Mujibur Rahman into account",^
The mdians, it seemed, had assumed a militant attitude,
the Times (London) in an article, captioned "Indian doves
turn hawks", said that the stark and alarming fact that
moot Indians had lost faith in the world community's efforts
to enforce a political solution was shown by a statement
by Mr,
-Jayaprakash Narayan, Founder of the Gandhi Peace
Foundation and a renowned advocate of the Mahatama's doctrine
of non-violence said, "The time has come for action. We
must give the Liberation Army heavy artillery, guns, anti-
tank weapons, machine guns and explosives,". At the same
time the Bharatiya Khitmatgar, a newly formed organisation
committed to promoting non-violence and goodwill between
Hindus and Muslims issued a statement urging Mrs. Gandhi
to recognise Bangla Desh and to support the Liberation Army
immediately. The organisation said that in view of President
Yahya's attitude the matter could only be resolved by military
action and urged, "to mount a naval blockade and supply the
freedom fighters with arms and training".^
According to the foreign press the Indian government
^ The Times. June 29. 1971
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was indeed doing this: giving the rebels sanctuary, training,
weapons and ammunition. It never categorically denied such
reports. Some of these reports are quoted below:
The Washington Post reported: The guerrilla who is
ft**' leader of a platoon of 37 men, freely concededthat almost all his ammunition and weapons come fromIndia, and that he once took his unit into India
after a successful ambush of army soldiers, that heknew would bear reprisals.^
The Indian army has been fully supporting the Mukti
Bahmi despite denials in New Delhi. This corres-
pondent (William J. Coughlin, Los Angeles Times) as
others has seen regular Indian Army Troops encamped
with the freedom fighters only a few yards from the
Pakistan border.
^
The Bangla Desh Mission members stated freely that
most of the guerrilla training is being conducted
in special camps in India. Arms and ammunition for
the guerrillas are being supplied either directly
by India or channelled by * international runners'
through India, Mission members say that guerrilla
training program has two parts-one for ordinary figh-
ters who undergo a month's basic training and another
more advanced training for specialists, such as sabo-
teurs, who are schooled for three months. There are
estimated to be 30,000 guerrillas now operating in
East Pakistan or making forays across the border
from India.
One resident expert on the military situation suggest-
ed that Bengalis who fled to India after March 25,
when the West Pakistan Army moved against East Pakistan,
and who are enrolled in Indian guerrilla schools now
had graduated and returned to Pakistan.
g
^ Washington Post. July 21, 1971
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Provi ding border sanctuaries arms aidand training and sometimes covering fire for the
^^
Sall
+r? 1Sta^Ce fiShters there is a persistentdanger that a minor border clash would explode intowaf* -Mia’s apparent hope is that hermilitary assistance will be enough to brine aboutan mde pendant Bangla Desh, short of war with Pak-istan, v/e are doing everything possible," Foreign
in Parliament: ~
The London Times also quoted evidence of India’s
yanoh
r
t^^
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V
eall
-
lnfantry units
’
which mutinied in
_
c arly enjoy sanctuary on Indian soil. Theyare certainly being trained in sabotage techniquesand are supplied with arms.
10
q
The Indian government has imposed restrictions onthe movement of foreign correspondents attemptimg
to visit refugee camps and the border areas in Westbengal and iiast India, It is understood that these
orders were issued because the government is embar-
rassedby the fact that the East Bengal guerrillas are
operating from bases in India...
11
The Indian press itself claimed.- That India will notfeel shy of extending sympathy and support to Bangla
Desh freedom fighters including the Mukti Fauj; des-
pite General Yahya’s threats of war. India the sour-
ces pointed out, had not kept hidden the facts ofits help to the freedom fighters nor felt shy of
acknowledging it. And if necessary this help would
take the form of arms supply.
^
The Indian Ambassador to the United States, Laksmi
Kant Jha, admitted that India was permitting its territory
to be used as a sanctuary for Bengali rebels fighting for
an independant East Pakistan, The Indian Ambassador who
appeared on a special hour long session of ’Issues and
^New York Times . July 27, 1971
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Answers," side stepped a question as to whether there were
Bengali training camps inside India and then said, "the
border is so completely wide open and vast that it would
be impossible to seal it." 1 ^
MrS Gandhi herself several times inferred that support
to the Mulct i Fauj was being given. The Prime Minister who
was being interviewed by some foreign correspondents in her
office at the Government Secretariat, seemed irritated when
asked about the military assistance India had been giving
the Bengali insurgents in East Pakistan. But she did not
categorically deny that India was helping them. She said
instead: "Perhaps you know they have many helpers mostly
their own people all over the world. Also many avenues are
open to them." She did not elaborate. 1^
Later irs Gandhi revealed in an exclusive interview
report with Newsweek that some of the training of the Bengali
guerrillas may be taking place on her side. On India support-
ing the Bengalis interviewer De Borchgrave quoted Mrs Gandhi,
Only when the refugees started coming, can you say that
India had a hand in the Pakistan crisis. Only after all the
Pakistan army terror, can you say well may be some of the
guerrillas came over from India, some of the training may
be taking place on our side but certainly not all.^
13 Washington Post . August 16, 1971
14 New York Times
. October 19, 1971
1 5J The Statesman
. November 9» 1971
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On the diplomatic level India adopted a very adamant
atitude towards Pakistan, and rebuffed all atempts on the
part of Yahya Khan to discuss the issue. In July 1971, Yahya
Khan called for an Indo-Pak summit, but his suggestions
were viewed as having a very sinister motivation as a part
of a bid to shift the focus of attention from the Bangla
Desh struggle and ‘convert it into an India Pakistan dispute.
The External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh described Yahya'
s
offer to meet Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as a 'trap*. He
said, "The military ruler should instead talk with Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman to solve the Bangla Desh issue.
Mrs Gandhi rejected President Yahya 's suggestion that
both sides should withdraw their forces from borders. She
also said no useful purpose would be served if she met the
President for talks. She said the basic problem revolved
round the differences between East and West Pakistan, and
it was therefore not an Indo-Pakistan issue. She also rej-
ected the idea of third party mediation between India and
17Pakistan. '
As late as November 19 » when conditions between India
and Pakistan we re really explosive, President Yahya Khan
offered friendship to the Indians. On the occasion of the
The Statesman. Nivember 9» 1971
17 Ibid. July 15, 1971
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end of the fast during the Muslim month of Ramadan he said,
India and Pakistan for too long have wasted their energies
and resourses in arming against one another. These resourses
should have been used to ripen the fruits of independance
of our two countries. Pakistan, •• he added, "is holding out
the hand of friendship to India.
President Yahya Khan even privately expressed willing-
ness to meet leaders of East Pakistan’s outlawed Awami League
to discuss a political solution of the civil war. But even
that did not materialize because despite India's assertion
that Bangla Desh officials operate free of Indian control,
the Indian government was determined to exercise right of
approval on any emissary chosen by East Pakistan for these
talks. India kept a close watch on the exile government
and would presumably want to monitor any contacts between
the rebels and the Pakistan government. The United States
reportedly endeavoured to help communications begin between
the two sides. "This has aroused India’s and Bangla Desh'
suspicions of America’s intention. Most Indian officials
argue that no political solution can be found which would
leave East Pakistan united within Pakistan. If that is the
only position which Awami League members and their patrons
the Indians would bring to a bargaining table there would
18 Washington Post . November 20, 1971
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be no basis for discussion with Yahya Khan, who launched
his military occupation of East Pakistan to preserve the
unity and integrity of Pakistanis two wings. 19
President Yahya Khan also agreed to U. Thant's proposal
of having United Nations observers provided India accepted
representatives on her soil also. India refused insisting
that she has remained opposed to admitting observers, "Many
people believe this is because military and other help is
being given to East Pakistan now intent on setting up a
separate state of Bangla Desh." 20
India took the position as Mrs Gandhi put it that the
repression in East Pakistan "is a threat to our security."
On the other hand she insisted also that the problems of
Pakistan were strictly Pakistan's internal affair not sub-
ject to United Nations intervention. It was apparent that
India did not want any solution of the crisis which would
keep the two wings of Pakistan together in any form.
On August 9» 1971 » taking the world by surprise, India
abondoned her policy of non-alignment to enter into a formal
alliance with the Soviet Union. According to official sour-
ces it seemed that the idea of the treaty had been conceived
two years ago bu it had been spurred on by the threat of
war. "Significantly the treaty was ratified in an atmosphere
19 Washington Post . November 12, 1971
2
^ New York Times. October 14, 1971 1
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charged with fear of an imminent Indo-Pakistan war and the
suspicion that India and Russia's hostile neighbour China
might intervene." 2 ’''
The 20-year friendship treaty between India and the
Soviet union was clearly intended to intimidate Pakistan.
Mr Swaran Singh, External Affairs Minister, described the
treaty in the Lok Sabha as a deterrent to any power that
may have aggressive designs on India. He said, " the treaty
commits all out Soviet support to India in the advent of any
outside attack. It also rules out Soviet arms aid or assist-
ance to any country that might cause military damage to the
2 ?
other party."
Pretty soon a fairly close identity of views between
India and the Soviet Union over the Bangla Desh issue was
evidenced in a joint statement issued by the foreign min-
isters of the two countries. "They both called for an
immediate political solution and for the creation of cond-
itions of safety for the return of refugees to their homes
in the interest of the entire people of Pakistan." 2 -^
Senior United States specialists maintained that India
and the Soviet Union were quietly collaborating to promote
the political separation of East Pakistan and its independ-
ence under Indian protection. The Soviets were said to have
cautioned India against premature recognition of Bangla
The Times . London, August 10, 1971
22
The Statesman. August 12, 1971
2
^ Ibid
.
August 12, 1971
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Desh. Instead they councelled India to deploy her armed
forces for self-defence as a warning to Pakistan and above
all as a show of support for the Bangla De sh movement. Mean-
while Moscow was giving political support to India's assist-
ance to the guerrillas in East Pakistan, in arms, money and
guidance, in the expectation of a major political victory
for India without the rush of war. 22*
Soon after India and the Soviet Union signed the treaty,
India J s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi started making plans
to visit the United States and some other Western countries,
her trip would apparently have a two fold objective, to
dispel misunderstandimg about the India-Soviet treaty, and
also to acquaint the governments of these countries herself
with the problems arising out of the Bangla Desh struggle.
Mrs Gandhi finally began her tour in October 1971. In the
meantime India and the Soviet leaders had exchanged several
visits and made broad claims of friendship and mutual sup-
port
.
After cordial exchanges in Vienna and Brussels Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi reached England. Her talks were
understood to have been wide ranging, although it is obvious
that the Bangla Desh issue was dominant. While Indian and
British assessments of the situation proved similar, as also
were their feelings for a political solution in East Bengal,
24 New York Times. October 24, 1971
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"one major difference understood to have emerged out of
these meetings was that Britain is thinking of a dialogue
between Islamabad and East Bengal within the framework of
Pakistan. The Indian assessment on the other hand was that
the situation had progressed too far to think in terms of
keeping Pakistan together." 2 ^
The next important stop In Mrs Gandhi's tour was the
United States, where she had prolonged talks with President
Nixon. However, after the second round of talks between
them it was apparent that the talks were a failure. There
was no evidence that they were in any way substantially
closer to a common solution. Thus the gap that separated
the United States and the Indian Government was just as wide
as it was before Mrs Gandhi’s arrival. 2 ^
On return from her three week Odyssey Mrs Gandhi was
in no way gloating with success. She said she was on the
whole satisfied with her talks with the world leaders, but
she could not say how effective intervention by them would
be in solving the Bangla Desh crisis without a war, 22 In
her statement to the Indian Parliament regarding her foreign
tour, she made it clear that India could not depend on the
2
^ The Statesman. November 1, 1971
2 6 Washington Post . November 6, 1971
22 The Statesman-.- November 14, 1971
8^
international community to solve the problems
.
28
It is clear that while India had not given express and
formal recognition for the rebel government of Bangla Desh,
it had recognised it informally and for most practical
purposes. On August 30, 1971, "Half a mile away from the
capital’s diplomatic colony of Chanathyapuri, and within
sight of the blue onion domes of the Pakistan High Commission,
the flag of Bangla Desh was proudly hoisted by the repres-
entative of the Bangla Desh Government over the new mission
building.
"
2 ^
The guerrillas clandestine radio station was also rep-
orted to be operating from India, from where continuous
reports were made of the successes of the Mukti Bahini and
the reverses of the Pakistan Army . 80
For months Indian pressure on the Pakistan forces in
East Pakistan had been building up. According to Vidya Charan
Shukla, Minister of State for Defence Production, India's
war machinery was in top gear. "It is waiting orders to
repel any Pakistani aggression on the borders. From alert
to scramble should not take more than two minutes-~such is
31
the alertness and the preparedness of our armed forces."^
The Statesman. November 16, 1971
29 Ibid . August 13, 1971
80 New York Times . July 25, 1971
8 ^ Hindustan Times. October 30* 1971
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Foreign observers who visited the area noticed heavily armed
Indian army troops in full battle gear massed along the
32border.
India appeared determined to push fprward for a quick
end to Pakistan’s military control of East Pakistan, a course
which made Indo-Pakistan war inevitable. India's decision
to take more direct part in the East Pakistan fighting was
visible from the several battalion sized and largerrattacks
across the border. Perhaps an important element in this
Indian push forward was a confidence in its military strength
and an accurate estimate of the weaknesses of the Pakistani
defences in East Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini with Indian arms
and training were also gaining strength. Thousands of new
Mukti Bahini guerrillas had finished thair training and enter-
ed East Pakistan. At roughly the same time the Indian army
reinforced on East Pakistan's borders began its own combat
operations
.
Unimpeachable Indian sources said that despite official
denial's Indian troops had crossed into East Pakistan to
silence the Pakistani guns. The Indian military sources
said that Indian troops had crossed over on October 31 and
November 1, 1971. On November23, President Yahya Khan declar-
ed a state of Emergency throughout Pakistan since fighting
between Indian and Pakistani troops was now raging eight
Washington Post . November 18, 1971
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miles inside the country's eastern province.
On December 1, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
demanded the withdrawal of all West Pakistani troops from
Dast Pakistan and declared their presence to be a threat
to Indian oecurity. This was Mrs Gandhi's toughest statement
to date on the explosive hostilities along India's eastern
border, which she delivered to the upper house of the Indian
Parliament. Even as she spoke Indian troops were fighting
some three miles within East Pakistan’s borders for the
fourth consecutive day, she said, "We have not posed a counter
threat in any sense of the word. But we cannot allow the
anhilation of the people next door to us." The speech was
in keeping with the Indian governments strategy of steadily
cranking up the military and political pressure against
Pakistan.
By now there was little ambiguity about India's posit-
ion on East Pakistan. On December 3» India declared a nation-
al emergency.
If India’s Prime Minister had written the scenario
for the opening of the new war in the sub-continent it could
not have varied greatly from what actually happened. For
weeks India had been mounting pressure on Pakistan seeking
Washington Post. December 1, 1971
Ibid. December 2, 1971
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to entice it into an all out war, for which India felt it
was amply ready.
All the major advantages in an India-Pakistan war were
with India. The major advantage held by the Indian forces
was their ability to operate on direct lines of supply and
communication from a central position. But Pakistan divided
into Bast and ^Vest by 1,000 miles of Indian territory, with
communications between the two wings cut off by India, was
at an obvious disadvantage. This naturally put India in a
commanding position, even if the forces of the two countr-
ies had been equally balanced which they were not, India
enjoyed a very considerable quantitative superiority over
Pakistan in both men and equipment.
On December 4, 1971 India finally embarked upon war.
Just before that Mrs Gandhi asked the" ’so called big nations’
not to order India to do what they wished on the basis of
their color superiority." Making an obvious reference to
the latest newspaper comments from London that Britain
might describe India again as an aggressor, the Indian Prime
Minister said, "Times have changed during the last five
years. If any country thinks that by calling us aggressors
it can pressurize us to forget our national interests then
that country is living in its own paradise and is welcome
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Thus once again India and Pakistan were at war, the
Indian army acting in concert with the Mukti Bahini, cut
through Pakistan’s defences in Bangla Desh in an integrated
air, ground and naval thrust. Soon after, war started on the
western front also.
India was gaining ground in East Pakistan and Pakistan
suffered reverses. "Outnumbered in tanks, planes and ground
troops, Yahya seemed to have embraced a formula for his
own destruction." Nowhere was Pakistan's weakness more appar-
ent than in East Pakistan. There Indian troops fighting side
by side with Mukti Bahini rebels threatened to capture most
of the province,* s major cities. The Indian navy bombarded
the principal port of Chittagong and reportedly sank two
Pakistani gunboats. Indian jets brazenly struck at the
capital of Dacca itself. At Dacca at the time was Newsweek’
s
Tony Clifton who filed the following account. "From the
roof of my hotel, I could see Indian jets straffing and
rocketing the airport ten miles away. The Indian MiG's
came in pairs, and they were met by slower Pakistani sabres.
Still the Paks put up a good fight. For half an hour the
two enemies fought a roller-coaster dogfight over the city,
blazing away with machine guns and air to air missiles."
35 The Statesman. December 3» 1971
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India's strategy was focused on creating an independant
Bangla Desh as quickly as possible. They wanted to be in
Dacca before the United Nations or the Big Powers could
put a stop to fighting.
On December 6, 1971 amidst thunderous cheers Mrs Gandhi
in Parliament announced the recognition of Bangla Desh.
Five hours after ‘that Pakistan snapped diplomatic relations
. . 37
with India. '
Finally on December 12, the seige of Dacca was complet-
ed by the Indian army in consort with the Mukti Bahini.
By that time the Pakistan army could hold out no more and
were thus compelled to surrender, they were cut off from
all outside help and were facing inevitable defeat. Soon
after the surrender a ceasefire came about, as by now India
had achieved its purpose, and Pakistan was in no condition
to fight.
The United Nations was not able to either prevent
the Indo-Pakistan war or to stop it after it had begun.
The Security Council found itself immobilized by Soviet
vetoes, procedural arguments and vicious invective between
China and Russia and India and Pakistan. During a long
procedural wrangle at a week end session of the United Nat-
ions Security Council, an African delegate abruptly pierced
3^ Newsweek . December 13» 1971
37 The Statesman. December 7 * 1971
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some consciences while the Council debated procedure. He
reminded his colleagues that people were dying on the sub-
continent. "They are dying in great numbers now, and still
the Council is blocked by great power ravalry, ideological
conflict, hypocrisy and indifference, from even taking a
modest first step to end the bloodshed . "^ 8
The Soviet Uni-on committed to the Indian side intended
to block any move for a ceasefire until India had achieved
its purpose. Russians Yakov Malik announced in advance that
he would veto any resolution except his own. This was a one
sided blast at Pakistan supported only by Poland. China’s
contribution to the debate was equally sterile and irrelev-
39
ant. 'The Security Council meetings were instead enlivened
by an exchange of ideological invective between the Soviet
envoy Yakov Malik and Huang Hua of China. "The Chinese deleg-
ate-pointedly referring to the Soviet delegate as 'Mister*
rather than 'Comrade', charged the Soviets as "social imper-
ialists" with backing India in order to take control of
the sub-continent. Mr Malik in turn called Mr Huang a
'jester for the imperialists*".
New York Times . December 7# 1971
^ Ibid. December 9. 1971
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CONCLUSION
The third India Pakistan war ended with the dismember-
ment of Pakistan, and the emergence of Bangla Desh as a
third major nation- on the sub-continent. Pakistan's attempts
at nation-making apparently ended in disaster. The separat-
ion of East Pakistan from the West, rooted in geography
and culture, had been made irrevokable by the military crack-
down which Yahya initiated to crush the secessionists in
East Pakistan. But it goes without saying that the division
of Pakistan was accelerated by India's intervention. The
Indian government's decision to use the brutality of the
Pakistan army as an excuse for dismembering the Pakistan
nation and resorting to the use of armed force is not difficult
to understand. Ever since the early 19^0 's Indian leaders
had regarded the idea of Pakistan as an 'absurdity' even
as an heresy. Since independence in 19^7 the two nations
had remained embroiled in numerous disputes, each regarding
the other as an enemy. First through American and then
Chinese military assistance Pakistan had acquired a military
capability that enabled her to assert her independence
from India in choosing her domestic and foreign policies.
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Often Pakistan challenged India's claims to righteous-
ness. It deemed India the aggressor in Goa and asserted
that India had initiated its border conflict with China in
1962 in order to scare the West, specially the United States
into giving it ever-increasing economic and military assist-
ance. Pakistan spokesman called India's secularism and
democracy as phoney. All in all, Pakistan had been a great
irritant to India for more than two decades. The dismember-
ment of Pakistan was clearly a welcome prospect and moved
to ensure that it would materialize.
Perhaps India envisaged a number of advantages to result
from Pakistan's dismemberment: a) With the emergence of*
Bangla Desh, a hostile power on both sides would be replaced
by a far weaker enemy on the Western side and a friend on
the Eastern, b) The Kashmir question would lose much of its
importance both domestic and international, c) The two-
nation theory which had asserted that muslims were a separate
nation from the Hindus, an assertion on the basis of which
Pakistan had been demanded and conceded, would be proven
wrong in as much as it would be shown that Bengali Muslims
did not regard themselves as one with West Pakistani Muslims.
Even though India enthusiastically pursued the task
of dismembering Pakistan as a panacea for some of her troubles,
it may find that its troubles are far from over. To begin
with there is no gaurantee that the refugees whose presence
on the Indian soil had been presented as an intolerable
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provocation have all returned home. Moreover there is no
tslling where secessionist movements such as the one that
tooK place in Bangla Desh will end on a sub-continent that
is peopled by many different races, religions ,, languages
and cultures. Although it supported the East Pakistani rebels
the Indian government does not favor demands for regional
autonomy at home, -where even talk of secession is a criminal
offence under the law. The power of the central authority
in India has borne down swiftly on recalcitrant provincial
movements. West Bengal the Indian half of Bangla Desh, has
been repeatedly subjected to military intervention and has
been under direct federal rule many a time. The possibility
cannot be ruled out that India’s own Bengalis never a cont-
ended minority, may one day initiate a secessionist movement
in their state of Bengal. Furthermore Bangla Desh the world's
eighth largest nation in terms of population (75 million),
and among the world's poorest, with a per capita annual
income of $30 , is sure to be an unsettling factor on the
sub-continent beacuse of its desperate poverty. Finally
there remains for India the monumental social and financial
incumberance of breathing life into Bangla Desh. No matter
how ironic it may seem, the losers in West Pakistan may
turn out to be in better shape than the winners in the long
run. For even though the Eastern province provided a major
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share of foreign exchange earnings, and substantial tax
revenue, West Pakistan will still retain a viable economy.
By Asian standards it has a sufficient industrial base and
is virtually self-sufficient in food. Politically however,
Pakistan does need to go a long way. Years of authoritarian
military rule have brought defeat and dismemberment to the
nation and disgrace to the rulers. Mr Bhutto’s call for
reappraisal is very pertinent, for a new era has opened on
the sub-continent and will require revised policies on the
part of all concerned. The restoration of democracy and the
institution of broad social reform would certainly be wel-
comed by the new Pakistan. The most challenging task before
Pakistani leadership is to pursuade the people to accept
the loss of East Pakistan, and to seek friendship and new
ties with it.
It is to India’s advantage also to explore new venues
of co-operation not only between India and Bangla Desh, but
between India and Pakistan. A more liberal Indian policy
on Kashmir would immensely help such an understanding. It
is also in India’s long term interest to foster reconcil-
iation between Islamabad and Dacca, Most important of all
is the quest for peace on the sub-continent. All these years
after partition. India and Pakistan have been arming them-
selves, just to confront each other. This has impoverished
both countries. India since it is larger should respect
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the territorial integrity of Pakistan and adopt a more
accommadating attitude, so as to encourage the prospect
of peace and prosperity.
The elimination of Pakistan as a serious military
threat to India, the emergence of India as the major milit-
ary power in the area and the vast strengthening of the
Soviet Union’s position have drastically altered the bal-
ance of power in South Asia. Although India won the battle
for Sast Pakistan, but in the larger perspective of world
politics, this is not the main thing. It is rather that
the Soviet Union has emerged from this conflict as the
military arsenal and political defender of India, with a
substantial naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and a base
of political and military operations on China’s southern
flank.
The Indo-Pakistan conflict has had significant implic-
ations for the power struggle between China and the Soviet
Union and a strategic struggle between Moscow and Washing-
ton. The Soviet Union probably gained more than anybody
else. India which won with Soviet arms and Soviet diplomatic
support in the United Nations is now dependant on aid from
the Soviet Union rather than from the United States. In the
long run this could be an awkward alliance.
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